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Abstract
Games corresponding to semi-infinite transportation and related assignment situations are
studied. In a semi-infinite transportation situation, one aims at maximizing the profit from
the transportation of a certain good from a finite number of suppliers to an infinite number
of demanders. An assignment situation is a special kind of transportation situation where the
supplies and demands for the good all equal one unit. It is shown that the special structure of
these situations implies that the underlying infinite programs have no duality gap and that the core
of the corresponding game is nonempty.
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1 Introduction
In 1972 Shapley and Shubik introduced (finite) assignment games. These are games corresponding to
an assignment situation where a (finite) set of agents has to be matched to another set of agents in such
a way that the revenue obtained from these matchings is as large as possible. Since this introduction
different generalizations related to these games have been developed. The paper of Llorca, Tijs and
Timmer (1999) provides an infinite extension of these games. They introduce semi-infinite bounded
assignment games in which one set of agents is finite and the other is countably infinite and prove that
these games have a nonempty core. That is, there exists an allocation of the maximal profit over all
the players such that any coalition of players cannot do better on its own. Sa´nchez-Soriano, Lo´pez
and Garcı´a-Jurado (2000) introduce finite transportation games, which are based on transportation
situations. Given a set of supply and demand points of a certain good, how much should be transported
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from each supply point to each demand point to maximize the revenue from this transportation plan?
The arising transportation games can be seen as a finite extension of the finite assignment games.
Fragnelli, Patrone, Sideri and Tijs (1999) and Timmer, Llorca and Tijs (2000) study games with a
nonempty core arising from semi-infinite linear programming situations, where one of the factors
involved is countably infinite, but the number of players is finite.
In this paper, we look at semi-infinite transportation problems where the number of suppliers is
finite and the number of demanders is countably infinite. For each semi-infinite transportationsituation
we define a related assignment problem. With the help of the results of Llorca et al. (1999), we show
that semi-infinite transportation problems have no duality gap and the corresponding semi-infinite
transportation games have a nonempty core.
This work is organized in five sections. In the next section, we present finite transportation and
assignment games. Section 3 summarizes the main results and concepts for semi-infinite bounded
assignment games that are needed to study semi-infinite transportationsituations. In section 4 we study
transportation games arising from semi-infinite transportation problems in which there is a countably
infinite number of players of one type, the matrix of benefits per unit is bounded and supplies and
demands are natural numbers. We show that the corresponding primal and dual programs have no
duality gap and prove that the games have a nonempty core. The proofs are based on an expansion-
contraction procedure, which uses a semi-infinite assignment problem associated to the corresponding
transportation problem generated by splitting the supply and demand points. In the final section, we
add a remark about the idea of dropping the conditions that force the supplies and the demands to be
natural numbers, in order to consider the transport of infinitely divisible goods.
2 Finite transportation and assignment games
A (finite) transportation problem describes a situation in which demands at several locations for a
certain good need to be covered by supplies from other locations. The transportation of one unit of
the good from a supply point to a demand point generates a certain profit. The goal of the cooperating
suppliers and demanders is to maximize the total profit from transport. For an example one may
consider a large supermarket that has to supply its stores at various locations with bottles of wine
stored in several warehouses.
More formally, let P be the finite set of supply points and Q the finite set of demand points. The
supply of the good at point i ∈ P equals si units and the demand at point j ∈ Q is dj units. Both si
and dj are (positive) integer numbers for all i ∈ P and j ∈ Q, we assume that the good is indivisible.
The profit of sending one unit of the good from supply point i to demand point j is tij , a non-negative
real number. All profits are gathered in the matrix T = [tij]i∈P,j∈Q. Hence, a transportation problem
can be described by the tuple (P,Q, T, s, d) where s = {si}i∈P and d = {dj}j∈Q are the vectors
containing respectively the supplies and demands of the good. For the sake of brevity we will use T
to denote the transportation problem (P,Q, T, s, d).
A transportation planX = [xij]i∈P,j∈Q is a matrix with integer entries where xij is the number
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of units of the good that will be transported from supply point i to demand point j. Of course, each
supply point i ∈ P cannot supply more than si units of the good,
∑
j∈Q xij ≤ si. Similarly, each
demand point j ∈ Q wants to receive at most dj units,
∑
i∈P xij ≤ dj . The maximal profit that the
supply and demand points can achieve equals
vp(T ) = max


∑
(i,j)∈P×Q
tijxij : X is a transportation plan

 .
A transportation plan X is also called a solution for T . Such a solution is an optimal solution if∑
(i,j)∈P×Q tijxij = vp(T ).
Given a transportation problem T , the corresponding transportation game (N,w) is a cooperative
TU game with player set N = P ∪ Q. Let S ⊂ N , S 6= ∅, be a coalition of players and define
PS = P ∩ S and QS = Q ∩ S. If S = PS then there are no demand points present in S and
therefore the supply points in S cannot get rid of their goods. In this case the worthw(S) of coalition
S equals zero. Similarly, if S = QS then the demand points in S cannot receive any units of the
good and w(S) = 0. Otherwise, the worth w(S) depends upon the possible transportation plans.
A transportation plan X(S) for coalition S is a transportation plan for the transportation problem
TS = (PS, QS, [tij]i∈PS ,j∈QS , {si}i∈PS , {dj}j∈QS). In this case
w(S) = max


∑
(i,j)∈PS×QS
tijxij : X(S) is a transportation plan for S


= vp(TS)
is the worth of coalition S.
One of the main issues in cooperative game theory is how to divide the total profit derived from
cooperation. One way to share this profit among the players inN is to do so according to an element
in the core. The core of a transportation game (N,w) is the set
C(w) =

x ∈ IRN :
∑
i∈N xi = w(N) and∑
i∈S xi ≥ w(S) for all S ⊂ N, S 6= ∅

 .
When a core-element x is proposed as a distribution of the total profit w(N), then each coalition S
will get at least as much as it can obtain on its own because
∑
i∈S xi ≥ w(S). So, no coalition has an
incentive to disagree with this proposal.
A special case of transportation problems occurs when all supplies si and demands dj equal 1.
This kind of problem is called an assignment problem because in an optimal plan we either have
that the whole supply of i ∈ P is transported to one demand point or nothing is transported. This
is like assigning supply points to demand points. For example, how should employees be assigned
to jobs such that the total costs are minimized? Such an assignment problem is described by a tuple
(M,W,A), where the setsM andW contain respectively the supply and demand points. The benefit
of assigning i ∈M to j ∈W equals aij ≥ 0, A = [aij]i∈M,j∈W .
In the next section, based on Llorca et al. (1999), we summarize the most relevant results about
semi-infinite assignment situations and corresponding games.
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3 Semi-infinite assignment games
In assignment situations we are interested in how to match, for example, a finite set of machines to
a set of jobs such that we achieve the highest possible benefit. Consider a firm with a finite number
of glass-cutting machines that can be programmed to produce a vase. This firm can choose from an
infinite number of patterns (their designers are very productive). The machines can produce all of
these patterns, but with different (bounded) rewards. The marketing policy of the firm is to make
unique vases. So, the firm has to tackle an assignment problem in which there is a finite number of
one type (machines) and an infinite number of the other type (possible designs). It’s goal is to achieve
the ‘maximal’ total benefits from matching the machines with the patterns.
A semi-infinite (bounded) assignment problem is denoted by a tuple (M,W,A), where M =
{1, 2, ...,m} is a finite set, W = IN, where IN = {1, 2, . . .} is the set of natural numbers, and the
nonnegative rewards aij are bounded from above, for all i ∈M , j ∈W . We will useA to denote the
assignment problem (M,W,A).
An assignment plan Y = [yij ]i∈M,j∈W is a matrix with 0,1-entries where yij = 1 if i is assigned
to j and yij = 0 otherwise. Each supply point will be assigned to at most one demand point and vice
versa, therefore
∑
j∈W yij ≤ 1 and
∑
i∈M yij ≤ 1. Then
vp(A) = sup


∑
(i,j)∈M×W
aijyij : Y is an assignment plan


is the smallest upper bound of the benefit that the supply and demand points can achieve. An assignment
plan Y is also called a solution for A. Such a solution is optimal if
∑
(i,j)∈M×W aijyij = vp(A).
The corresponding assignment game (N,w) is the game with player set N = M ∪ W . Let
MS =M ∩S andWS =W ∩S. Then the coalitionS of players inN receives w(S) = 0 if S =MS
or S = WS because in these cases there is nothing to be assigned to. Otherwise, w(S) = vp(AS)
where AS is the (semi-infinite) assignment problem (MS,WS, [aij]i∈MS,j∈WS ).
Relaxing the 0,1-condition of yij to nonnegativity does not change the value of the program, as
the next lemma shows.
Lemma 1
vp(A) = sup


∑
(i,j)∈M×W
aijyij :
∑
j∈W yij ≤ 1,
∑
i∈M yij ≤ 1,
yij ≥ 0 for all i ∈M, j ∈W

 .
Proof. Define
vp(A
∗) = sup


∑
(i,j)∈M×W
aijyij :
∑
j∈W yij ≤ 1,
∑
i∈M yij ≤ 1,
yij ≥ 0 for all i ∈M, j ∈W

 .
Obviously, vp(A) ≤ vp(A∗). We will show that vp(A) ≥ vp(A∗)− ε for all ε > 0.
Let ε > 0 and take a solutionY ′ ofA∗ such that
∑
(i,j)∈M×W aijy
′
ij ≥ vp(A
∗)− ε/2. Let n ∈W
be such that
∑
i∈M
∑n
j=1 aijy
′
ij ≥ vp(A
∗)− ε. It is well known that there exists an integer optimal
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solution Y ′′ of the finite program
max


∑
i∈M
n∑
j=1
aijyij :
∑n
j=1 yij ≤ 1,
∑
i∈M yij ≤ 1,
yij ≥ 0 for all i ∈M, j = 1, . . . , n

 =: vp(A∗n)
and that
∑
i∈M
n∑
j=1
aijy
′′
ij
= max


∑
i∈M
n∑
j=1
aijyij :
∑n
j=1 yij ≤ 1,
∑
i∈M yij ≤ 1,
yij ∈ {0, 1} for all i ∈M, j = 1, . . . , n


=: vp(An),
where the finite assignment problem (M, {1, . . . , n}, [aij]i∈M,j=1,...,n) is denoted by An. Then
vp(An) =
∑
i∈M
n∑
j=1
aijy
′′
ij ≥
∑
i∈M
n∑
j=1
aijy
′
ij ≥ vp(A
∗)− ε
where the first inequality follows from the fact that [y′ij]i∈M,j=1,...,n is a solution ofA∗n. Together with
vp(A) ≥ vp(An) we conclude that vp(A) ≥ vp(A∗)− ε. 2
If we replace the condition yij ∈ {0, 1} by yij ≥ 0 then the dual program, with value vd(A), of
the problem that determines vp(A) equals
vd(A) = inf
∑
i∈M
ui +
∑
j∈W
vj
s.t. ui + vj ≥ aij, for all i ∈M, j ∈W
ui, vj ≥ 0, for all i ∈M, j ∈W.
LetOd(A) be the set of optimal solutions of this dual problem. Both the primal and the dual program
have an infinite number of variables and an infinite number of restrictions. In general, ∞ × ∞-
programs show a gap between the optimal primal and dual value. There is a large literature on the
existence or absence of so-called duality gaps in (semi-)infinite programs. See for example the books
by Glashoff and Gustafson (1983) and Goberna and Lo´pez (1998).
These semi-infinite assignment problems can be analyzed by finite approximation matricesAn ∈
IRm×n where An = [aij]i∈M,j=1,2,...,n, and by means of the so-called hard-choice number of the
matrix A. The following example illustrates this last concept.
Example 2 LetM = {1, 2, 3},W = IN and
A =


3 3 3 3 3 3 3 . . .
10 3 8 2 9 2 2 . . .
7
4 1
3
2
5
3 4
9
5
11
6 . . .

 .
The choice set Ci of agent i ∈ M consists of maximal |M | agents inW that give the highest reward
aij when assigned to i ∈M , if they exist. If more than |M | agents inW satisfy this criterion then the
choice set contains only those |M | agents with the the smallest ranking number inW .
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In this example, no matter to whom agent 1 ∈M is assigned, the resulting reward equals a1j = 3.
Hence, we take the three agents with the smallest ranking number and C1 = {1, 2, 3}.
If agent 2 ∈ M is assigned to agent 1 ∈ W then they obtain the maximal reward of 10. The
second largest value is a25 = 9 and a23 = 8 is the third largest value. Thus, C2 = {1, 3, 5}.
Finally, assigning agent 3 ∈M to agent 5 ∈W results in the maximal reward a35 = 4. However,
there is no second largest value because a3n goes to 2 when n goes to infinity. So, this agent has
C3 = {5}.
The hard-choice number n∗(A) is the smallest number in N ∪ {0} such that ∪i∈MCi ⊂
{1, 2, .., n∗(A)} . In this example we have n∗(A) = 5.
The following theorem establishes that the primal and the dual problem have the same value and
there exists an optimal solution of the dual problem.
Theorem 3 (Theorem 3.9 in Llorca et al. (1999)) Let (M,W,A) be a semi-infinite bounded assign-
ment problem. Then vp(A) = vd(A) andOd(A) 6= ∅.
A sketch of the proof of the latter statement goes as follows. Take for each n ∈ IN, n > n∗(A),
an element (un, vn) of Od(An) and remove all coordinates of vn with index larger than n∗(A). The
set of all those elements, which is in the finite dimensional space IRm × IRn∗(A), is bounded. Without
loss of generality, suppose that the limit, when n goes to infinity, of such a sequence exists (otherwise
take a subsequence) and denote this limit by (u, v). With the aid of (u, v) construct the vector (û, v̂)
by taking û = u and v̂ is obtained from v by adding an infinite number of zeros. Then (û, v̂) is an
optimal dual solution of the corresponding semi-infinite bounded assignment problem.
This theorem is of great importance for the next section. There we show through related semi-
infinite assignment games that semi-infinite transportation problems have no duality gap and the
corresponding games have a nonempty core.
4 Semi-infinite transportation problems and related games
In this section we extend finite transportation problems to semi-infinite transportation problems.
These are transportation problems where the number of one type of agents (demanders or suppliers) is
countably infinite. This kind of situations can appear in market models where the number of potential
customers can be seen as infinite. For example, when a firm introduces a new product in the consumer
market then each consumer in the infinite set of potential consumers has a finite demand for this new
product. We assume thatQ = IN, and that the profits tij are bounded from above, that is ‖T‖∞ <∞.
Corresponding to such a semi-infinite transportation problem we define a semi-infinite transporta-
tion game (N,w) with player set N = P ∪ Q. As before, the worth of coalition S equals zero,
w(S) = 0, if S = PS or S = QS and
w(S) = sup


∑
(i,j)∈PS×QS
tijxij : X(S) is a transportation plan for S


= vp(TS)
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otherwise.
Given a semi-infinite transportation problem T we construct a related semi-infinite assignment
problemA(T ) in the following way:
• Each supply point i ∈ P is split into si supply points named i1, i2, ..., isi, each with a supply
of 1 unit. Hence,M = {ir : i ∈ P, r ∈ {1, ..., si}}.
• Each demand point j ∈ Q is split into dj different players j1, j2, ..., jdj, each with a demand
of 1 unit. Therefore,W = {jc : j ∈ Q, c ∈ {1, ..., dj}}. Notice thatW is a countably infinite
set of players becauseQ = IN.
• Define air, jc = tij for all ir ∈M, jc ∈W .
The next lemma deals with relations between solutions in T and A(T ).
Lemma 4 Each solution for T determines a solution forA(T ), and conversely. These solutions have
the same value.
Before we prove the lemma, we give an example to illustrate a procedure that we use in the proof.
Example 5 Consider the transportation problem T with P = {1, 2, 3},Q = IN and
2 1 2 1 1 1 . . . dj
2 1 12
2
3
3
4
4
5
5
6 . . .
1 0 2 112 1
2
3 1
3
4 1
4
5 . . .
3 3 2 112 1
2
3 1
3
4 1
4
5 . . .
si
= T
A solution for T is the transportation plan
X =


0 0 1 0 0 1 0 · · ·
0 0 1 0 0 0 0 · · ·
2 1 0 0 0 0 0 · · ·


with value
∑
(i,j)∈P×Q tijxij = 11. The corresponding assignment problem A(T ) has supply points
M = {11, 12, 21, 31, 32, 33} and demand pointsW = {11, 12, 21, 31, 32, 41, 51, 61, ...}. From the
solution X for T we construct a solution Y for A(T ) where each cell in X with xij > 0 will
correspond to xij cells in Y with entry 1. The procedure goes as follows. We start with i = j = 1.
If xij 6= 0 then we look for the smallest values for r and c such that both the points ir and jc are not
assigned to any point, that is, row ir and column jc in Y contained no entry equal to 1 so far. Define
yir,jc = 1. Continue searching for new values r and c until
∑si
r=1
∑dj
c=1 yir,jc = xij . Repeat this for
all (i, j) ∈ P × Q with xij 6= 0, where you first consider the first row and first column in X , then
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the second row and second column, and so on. Set yir,jc = 0 for the remaining (ir, jc) ∈ M ×W .
Following this procedure we obtain the assignment plan
11 12 21 31 32 41 51 61 71 · · · W
11 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 · · ·
12 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 · · ·
21 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 · · ·
31 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 · · · = Y
32 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 · · ·
33 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 · · ·
M
with value
∑
(ir,jc)∈M×W air,jcyir,jc = 11. Conversely, given a solution Y for A(T ), a solutionX
for T is given by xij =
∑si
r=1
∑dj
c=1 yir,jc for all i ∈ P , j ∈ Q.
Proof of lemma 4. LetX be a solution for T . Define the matrix Y ∈ {0, 1}M×W by
yir,jc =


1 if
(i) r ∈
(∑
q<j xiq,
∑
q≤j xiq
]
,
(ii) c ∈
(∑
p<i xpj,
∑
p≤i xpj
]
and
(iii) r −
∑
q<j xiq = c−
∑
p<i xpj,
0 otherwise.
We show that Y is a solution of A(T ). By definition yir,jc ∈ {0, 1}.
Assume that yir,jc = 1 and c < dj , that is, there exists a jc′ ∈W with c′ > c. Then
r−
∑
q<j
xiq = c−
∑
p<i
xpj < c
′ −
∑
p<i
xpj
where the equality follows from yir,jc = 1 and the inequality from c < c′. Hence, condition (iii) is
not satisfied for (ir, jc′) and therefore yir,jc′ = 0 for all c′ > c.
Next, consider (ir, j ′c′)with j ′ > j. If xij′ = 0 then
∑
q<j′ xiq =
∑
q≤j′ xiq, condition (i) cannot
be satisfied and therefore yir,j′c′ = 0. Otherwise, if xij′ > 0 then r ≤
∑
q≤j xiq ≤
∑
q<j′ xiq, where
the first inequality follows from yir,jc = 1. But then r 6>
∑
q<j′ xiq, condition (i) is not satisfied for
(ir, j ′c′) and so, yir,j′c′ = 0.
We conclude that if yir,jc = 1 then the remainder of row ir in Y (as of column jc) contains only
entries equal to zero. Similarly, we can show that the remainder of column jc (as of row ir) also
consists of entries equal to zero. Hence,
∑
jc∈W yir,jc ≤ 1 and
∑
ir∈M yir,jc ≤ 1. The matrix Y is a
solution of A(T ).
Finally, let Y be a solution of A(T ). Define xij =
∑si
r=1
∑dj
c=1 yir,jc for all i ∈ P , j ∈ Q. Then,
xij is a non-negative integer and for all j ∈ Q we have
∑
i∈P
xij =
∑
i∈P
si∑
r=1
dj∑
c=1
yir,jc =
dj∑
c=1
∑
i∈P
si∑
r=1
yir,jc
=
dj∑
c=1
∑
ir∈M
yir,jc ≤
dj∑
c=1
1 = dj.
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The inequality holds because Y is a solution ofA(T ). Analogously, we can show that
∑
j∈Q xij ≤ si
for all i ∈ P . Hence, X is a solution of T . It is a trivial exercise to show that both solutions have the
same value. 2
The following result is an immediate consequence of lemma 4.
Lemma 6 Let T be a semi-infinite transportation problem and A(T ) the corresponding assignment
problem. Then vp(T ) = vp(A(T )).
Recall that vp(T ) is the value of the problem
sup


∑
(i,j)∈P×Q
tijxij : X is a transportation plan

 .
Similarly to lemma 1 for semi-infinite assignment problems, we can show that relaxing the condition
xij ∈ IN to xij ≥ 0 will not change the value of the problem. The dual problemD corresponding to
this program is
inf


∑
i∈P
siui +
∑
j∈Q
djvj : ui + vj ≥ tij , ui, vj ≥ 0 for all i ∈ P, j ∈ Q

 .
We denote the value of this program by vd(T ) and Od(T ) is the set of optimal solutions of D.
Similarly, we define for the related assignment problem A(T )
vd(A(T )) = inf


∑
ir∈M
uir +
∑
jc∈W
vjc :
uir + vjc ≥ air,jc, uir, vjc ≥ 0
for all ir ∈M, jc ∈W

 .
Let Od(A(T )) be the set of optimal solutions of this infimum problem. As is the case for semi-
infinite assignment problems, semi-infinite transportation problems have no duality gap, that is,
vp(T ) = vd(T ) and Od(T ) is nonempty.
Theorem 7 Let T be a semi-infinite transportation problem. Then
1. vp(T ) = vd(T ) and
2. Od(T ) 6= ∅.
Proof. Theorem 3 states thatOd(A(T )) 6= ∅, so, let (u, v) ∈ Od(A(T )). Then, uir + vjc ≥ air,jc =
tij for all ir ∈M , jc ∈W . Thus for all i ∈ P , j ∈ Q,
si∑
r=1
dj∑
c=1
(uir + vjc) = dj
si∑
r=1
uir + si
dj∑
c=1
vjc ≥
si∑
r=1
dj∑
c=1
tij = sidjtij.
Dividing both sides by sidj gives
si∑
r=1
uir/si +
dj∑
c=1
vjc/dj ≥ tij .
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Define u¯i :=
∑si
r=1 uir/si and v¯j :=
∑dj
c=1 vjc/dj. Then u¯i ≥ 0, v¯j ≥ 0, and u¯i + v¯j ≥ tij for all
i ∈ P , j ∈ Q. Hence,
vp(T ) = vp(A(T )) = vd(A(T )) =
∑
i∈P
siu¯i +
∑
j∈Q
dj v¯j ≥ vd(T )
where the first equality follows from lemma 6, the second one from theorem 3, the third one from
(u, v) ∈ Od(A(T )), and the last inequality follows from the definition of vd(T ). From duality theory
we know that vp(T ) ≤ vd(T ) and therefore
vp(T ) =
∑
i∈P
siu¯i +
∑
j∈Q
dj v¯j = vd(T ).
We conclude that vp(T ) = vd(T ) and (u¯, v¯) ∈ Od(T ). 2
A concept related to the core is the so-called Owen set4, which is defined by
Owen(T ) =

x ∈ IRN :
∃(u, v) ∈ Od(T ) such that xk = skuk
if k ∈ P and xk = dkvk if k ∈ Q

 .
This set is not empty because Od(T ) 6= ∅. An element of the Owen set is easy to find and it turns out
to be an element of the core of the corresponding transportation game as well.
Theorem 8 Let T be a semi-infinite transportation problem and (N,w) the corresponding game.
Then, Owen(T ) ⊂ C(w).
Proof. Let x ∈ Owen(T ) and let (u, v) ∈ Od(T ) be such that xk = skuk if k ∈ P and xk = dkvk
if k ∈ Q. Then ∑
i∈N
xi =
∑
i∈P
siui +
∑
j∈Q
djvj = vd(T ) = vp(T ) = w(N),
where the third equality follows from theorem 7. Next, let S ⊂ N , S 6= ∅. If S = PS or S = QS
then
∑
k∈S xk ≥ 0 = w(S) because xk ≥ 0 for all k ∈ N . Otherwise, we know that ui + vj ≥ tij
for all i ∈ P , j ∈ Q, and this holds in particular for all i ∈ PS , j ∈ QS . Thus
∑
i∈S
xi =
∑
i∈PS
siui +
∑
j∈QS
djvj ≥ vd(TS) = vp(TS) = w(S).
We conclude that x ∈ C(w). 2
In general, the Owen set does not coincide with the core of a transportation game, as the following
example shows.
4Owen (1975) presents a method to find a nonempty subset of the core of a linear production game. Gellekom et al.
(2000) names this set the ‘Owen set’.
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Example 9 Let T be a transportation problem with P = {1},Q = IN, and
2 1 1 1 · · · dj
4 3 112 1
2
3 1
3
4 · · · = T
si
In this problem the Owen set equals Owen(T ) = {(8; 2, 0, 0, ...)}. However, the point (10; 0, 0, ...)
is an element of the core of the corresponding transportation game. Hence, Owen(T ) is strictly
contained in the core C(w).
5 Final remark
In our future research we will study semi-infinite transportation problems where supplies and demands
are positive real numbers. The underlying idea is to consider infinitely divisible goods. One can think
of using pipelines instead of containers for the transportation of petrol. In this framework we consider
two semi-infinite transportation situations. The first one is such that the total demand for the good is
infinite and the individual demands are bounded from below, and in the second one the total demand
is finite. In both cases, we will show that the corresponding semi-infinite transportation games have a
nonempty core.
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